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Price Impact Possibilities
By Wendy Gerwick Couture*
I. Introduction
In Basic Inc. v. Levinson, the Court adopted the fraud-on-the-
market presumption of reliance.1 This presumption encompasses
two constituent presumptions: rst, material misrepresentations
publicly disseminated into an ecient market are presumed to be
reected in the market price; and second, plaintis are presumed
to rely on the integrity of the market price when making their
investment decisions.2 When these two constituent presumptions
are combined, plaintis are presumed to rely on the misrepresen-
tations themselves when purchasing or selling securities.
In Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (“Halliburton
II”), the Court held that defendants could rebut the fraud-on-the-
market presumption of reliance at the class certication stage by
showing the absence of “price impact”:
Price impact is thus an essential precondition for any Rule 10b-5
class action. While Basic allows plaintis to establish that precondi-
tion indirectly, it does not require courts to ignore a defendant's
direct, more salient evidence showing that the alleged misrepresen-
tation did not actually aect the stock's market price and,
consequently, that the Basic presumption does not apply.3
In eect, the absence of price impact would directly undercut the
rst constituent presumption of the Basic presumption.4 The
price impact inquiry is binary—“simply ‘was there impact,’ not
‘how large was the distortion.’ ’’5
In the wake of Halliburton II, courts and scholars have
wrestled with the focus of the price impact inquiry. Assuming
that the case involves an unduly positive statement, does the
price impact inquiry focus on the existence of a price increase at
the time of the statement, a price drop upon the disclosure of the
truth, or both? In this essay, I identify ten unique scenarios (or
price impact possibilities) and argue that the appropriate price
impact inquiry varies depending on which scenario is alleged.
This essay proceeds in ve additional parts. In Part II, I explain
the current uncertainty about the focus of the price impact
inquiry. In Part III, I argue that “price impact” is best understood
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as “price distortion,” such that it requires a comparison with the
no-fraud counterfactual scenario. In Part IV, I identify the
variables relevant to the no-fraud counterfactual scenario and
combine these variables to identify ten potential scenarios, each
with a unique price impact inquiry. In Part V, I consider the
implications of these ten price impact possibilities, and, in Part
VI, I briey conclude.
II. Uncertainty About the Focus of the Price Impact In-
quiry
In Halliburton II, the Court stated that defendants could rebut
the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance with “evidence
that the asserted misrepresentation (or its correction) did not af-
fect the market price of the defendant's stock.”6 But the Court did
not provide guidance on the circumstances in which the inquiry
should focus on front-end impact, back-end impact, or both.7 For
example, Georey Miller asks: “[W]hat happens when the
defendant introduces evidence showing that the price of the secu-
rity was not impacted when the truth came out, but the plainti
responds with evidence showing that the price was impacted
when the false statement was originally made?”8
To date, most courts have focused on back-end impact.9 As
explained by Merritt B. Fox, this has a logical basis: “If the cor-
rection negatively aects price at the time of its disclosure, the
misstatement must have made the price higher than it otherwise
would have been. Why else, after all, would the truth have had a
negative eect on price?”10 And yet, as recognized by Jill E. Fisch,
back-end impact is only “circumstantial evidence of ex ante price
distortion.”11 Indeed, back-end impact might demonstrate, not
merely a response to the substance of the corrective disclosure,
but also a response to the revelation “that the company had previ-
ously provided false information to the market (perhaps inadver-
tently, perhaps not, but false nonetheless).”12 This second revela-
tion might cause so-called “collateral damage,”13 incurred because
investors might anticipate an SEC investigation or shareholder
class action,14 which would require the rm to expend defense
costs15 and potentially to pay penalties or damages,16 and because
investors might lose trust in the rm's management and internal
controls.17
The uncertainty about the focus of the price impact inquiry has
played out most prominently in the context of alleged conrma-
tory (or “maintenance”) misrepresentations, which merely conrm
the market's preexisting (incorrect) expectations and thus, logi-
cally, do not move the stock price at the time that the statements
become public.18 For example, as explained by Donald C.
Langevoort, “if the market had been anticipating earnings of $3
Securities Regulation Law Journal
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per share, then lying by reporting earnings of $3 would probably
have little if any impact on the price of the stock.”19 Most (but not
all20) courts21 and scholars22 have analyzed the price impact of an
alleged conrmatory misrepresentation—not by examining
whether there was price movement at the time of the misrepre-
sentation—but by examining whether there was price movement
at the time of the corrective disclosure.
In sum, there is uncertainty about the focus of the price impact
inquiry. Does the presence of either front-end or back-end impact
always prevent the defendant from rebutting the fraud-on-the-
market presumption of reliance, or only in some circumstances
(such as alleged conrmatory misrepresentations)? Stated an-
other way, are there any circumstances in which the absence of
front-end impact (despite the existence of back-end impact), or
the absence of back-end impact (despite the existence of front-end
impact), rebuts the presumption?
III. Price Impact as Price Distortion
In order to answer these questions, I rst contend that “price
impact” should be understood as synonymous with “price distor-
tion” rather than “price movement.” The essence of the fraud-on-
the-market presumption of reliance is the notion that investors,
by trading at the market price, indirectly relied on the alleged
misrepresentation because it distorted the market price.23 In
articles published shortly before Halliburton II, Professor Fisch
described price distortion as “the core concept on which the Basic’s
reasoning depends,”24 and Lucian A. Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell
argued that “[t]he issue of whether there is a class of investors
similarly situated in terms of reliance should turn on whether
there is fraudulent distortion.”25
The Halliburton II Court likewise equated the concepts of price
impact and price distortion, using the terms interchangeably:
More than 25 years ago, we held that plaintis could satisfy the
reliance element of the Rule 10b-5 cause of action by invoking a
presumption that a public, material misrepresentation will distort
the price of stock traded in an ecient market, and that anyone
who purchases the stock at the market price may be considered to
have done so in reliance on the misrepresentation. We adhere to
that decision . . . [But] defendants must be aorded an opportunity
before class certication to defeat the presumption through evi-
dence that an alleged misrepresentation did not actually aect the
market price of the stock.26
Indeed, post-Halliburton II, numerous scholars have treated
the concepts of price impact and price distortion as synonymous.27
Therefore, the price impact inquiry should focus on the existence
of price distortion.
Price distortion is inherently comparative. A price is distorted
[Vol. 44:3 2016] Price Impact
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by fraud if there is a dierence between (1) the stock price in the
world in which the allegedly fraudulent misrepresentation was
made (the real world) and (2) the stock price in the imaginary
world in which there was no fraud (the no-fraud counterfactual
scenario).28 As Professor Langevoort explains, “price distortion is
the dierence between the price that prevailed and the price had
there been no fraud.”29 Therefore, any inquiry into price impact
must likewise include an inquiry into the no-fraud counterfactual
scenario.
IV. Price Impact Possibilities
A. Variables Relevant to the No-Fraud Counterfactual
Scenario
The applicable no-fraud counterfactual scenario depends on
several variables. First, one must identify the relationship among
the alleged misrepresentation, the market's expectation, and the
corrective disclosure. Second, one must determine whether the
no-fraud counterfactual scenario envisions disclosure of the truth
or silence.
1. Relationship Among the Misrepresentation, the
Market's Expectation, and the Corrective Disclosure
The rst variable relevant to the no-fraud counterfactual sce-
nario depends on the relationship among the alleged misrepre-
sentation, the market's expectation prior to the representation,
and the alleged corrective disclosure.30 The Seventh Circuit
provided the following helpful examples of how these elements
interact to aect the no-fraud counterfactual inquiry:
For example, say the president of a company lies to the public about
earnings (“We made $200 million more than we predicted this
year!”) and immediately afterward the company's stock price rises
by $10. The new price could be inated by exactly $10 if in reality
the company had merely met expectations and its stock price would
have remained the same had the president told the truth. Or the
ination could be less than $10 if, say, the company really only
made $100 million more than predicted and the stock price would
have risen by only $5 had the president told the truth. And the in-
ation might be signicantly more than $10 if the company had
actually made less than predicted and the stock price would have
fallen had the truth been known. Note too that a stock can be in-
ated even if the price remains the same or declines after a false
statement because the price might have fallen even more (e.g., “We
only lost $100 million this year,” when actually losses were $200
million).31
In sum, there are ve unique scenarios,32 reecting diering
relationships among the alleged misrepresentation, the market's
expectation prior to the representation, and the alleged corrective
disclosure. For ease of reference, I have assigned each scenario a
Securities Regulation Law Journal
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shorthand name.
First is the “Misdirecting Misrepresentation.” In this scenario,
the misrepresentation conveys information that is more favorable
than what the market anticipated, while the corrective disclosure
conveys information that is worse than what the market had
anticipated prior to the misrepresentation.
Second is the “Inating Misrepresentation.” In this scenario,
the misrepresentation conveys information that is more favorable
than what the market anticipated, while the corrective disclosure
conveys information that is consistent with what the market had
anticipated prior to the misrepresentation.
Third is the “Aggrandizing Misrepresentation.” In this sce-
nario, the misrepresentation conveys information that is more
favorable than what the market anticipated; the corrective
disclosure conveys information that is still more favorable than
what the market had anticipated prior to the misrepresentation,
but the corrective information is worse what was conveyed by the
misrepresentation.
Fourth is the “Conrming Misrepresentation.” In this scenario,
the misrepresentation conveys information that is consistent
with what the market anticipated, while the corrective disclosure
conveys information that is worse than what the market had
anticipated prior to the misrepresentation.
Fifth is the “Soft-Landing Misrepresentation.” In this scenario,
the misrepresentation conveys information that is worse than
what the market anticipated, while the corrective disclosure
conveys information that is even worse than what was conveyed
by the misrepresentation.
2. Accurate Disclosure or Silence
The second variable relevant to the no-fraud counterfactual
scenario depends on whether the no-fraud counterfactual sce-
nario envisions (1) disclosure of the truth or (2) silence. For ease
of reference, I have labeled the former Type A and the latter
Type B.
Type A misrepresentations are made, in lieu of accurate
disclosure, when a company has a duty to speak (e.g., because of
SEC line-item reporting requirements).33 The no-fraud counterfac-
tual scenario is accurate disclosure.
Type B misrepresentations are made, in lieu of silence, when a
company does not have a duty to speak. The no-fraud counterfac-
tual scenario is silence.34 Professor Langevoort provides the fol-
lowing example of a Type B misrepresentation:
Suppose a pharmaceutical company is having troubles with Food &
Drug Administration (FDA) inspectors, who are threatening it with
the possibility of signicant sanctions, which the company is trying
[Vol. 44:3 2016] Price Impact
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to head o. Assume further that this is something about which
there is no immediate line-item disclosure requirement. However,
in some public statement, the company says or suggests that its
dealing with the FDA are unproblematic, which is materially false.35
Certainly, a company could voluntarily make an accurate
disclosure rather than making a Type B misrepresentation, but
the securities laws (including the prohibition on securities fraud)
do not require the company to do so.
Most courts and scholars have assumed that, when analyzing
the price distortion of an alleged misrepresentation, the no-fraud
counterfactual scenario is accurate disclosure.36 This is an
incomplete analysis, however, because it assumes that all
misrepresentations are Type A. A notable exception is Professor
Langevoort, who in a 2009 article discussing the appropriate
counterfactual scenario to use when measuring damages,
recognized the existence of what I have labeled Type B
misrepresentations: “[W]e cannot simply say that the counterfac-
tual to an alleged misrepresentation is necessarily the revelation
of the truth. If there was no duty to disclose and silence was a re-
alistic option, then that actually may be the more likely
counterfactual ‘no fraud’ state of the world.”37 In a recent post-
Halliburton II article, Professor Langevoort applied this earlier
insight to price impact.38
B. Ten Price Impact Possibilities
Combining the above-identied variables (the ve scenarios
reecting varying relationships among the alleged misrepresen-
tation, the market's expectation prior to the representation, and
the alleged corrective disclosure and the two types of misrepre-
sentation with diering no-fraud counterfactual scenarios) results
in ten price impact possibilities.
Below are hypothetical price charts depicting each possibility.
The solid line represents the actual price movement, and the dot-
ted line represents the no-fraud counterfactual scenario. The dif-
ference between the solid and dotted lines reects the price distor-
tion, or price impact. These charts are simplied. First, they
assume that the market price is unaected by other information
between the time of the alleged misrepresentation and the al-
leged corrective disclosure. Second, they assume that an event
study can dierentiate the impacts of the alleged misrepresenta-
tion and the alleged corrective disclosure from the simultaneous
impacts of overall market changes39 and other rm-specic news.40
Despite these simplications, these charts provide guidance on
the appropriate focus of the price impact inquiry for each
possibility.
Securities Regulation Law Journal
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1. Type A Misdirecting Misrepresentation
The solid line in Chart 1 depicts the hypothetical price move-
ment of a Misdirecting Misrepresentation, where the alleged mis-
representation conveys information that is more favorable than
what the market anticipated, while the corrective disclosure
conveys information that is worse than what the market had
anticipated prior to the alleged misrepresentation. The dotted
line depicts the no-fraud counterfactual scenario, where the
company had the duty to disclose the truth at the time of the al-
leged misrepresentation. The dierence between the two lines
reects the price impact of the alleged misrepresentation. As
Chart 1 shows, in order for the evidence of price impact to be con-
sistent with this scenario, there should be both (1) a front-end
price increase, which under-measures the amount of price impact,
and (2) a back-end price drop, which (because of collateral dam-
age) may slightly over-measure the amount of price impact.
[Vol. 44:3 2016] Price Impact
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2. Type B Misdirecting Misrepresentation
The solid line in Chart 2 is identical to the solid line in Chart 1
because both charts depict a Misdirecting Misrepresentation, but
the dotted no-fraud counterfactual line diers. Here, where the
company did not have a duty to speak, there is a spectrum of no-
fraud counterfactual scenarios. On one end of the spectrum, if
the company had merely remained silent, the information might
have never reached the market, leading the market price to
remain steady (albeit inated above fundamental value). On the
other end of the spectrum, if the company had not misdirected
the market, the information might have seeped into the market
price even sooner. The dierence between the solid line and the
spectrum of dotted lines reects the price impact of the alleged
misrepresentation. As Chart 2 shows, in order for the evidence of
price impact to be consistent with this scenario, there should be
both (1) a front-end price increase, which might under-measure
the amount of price impact (e.g., if the information would have
been reected in the market price even sooner if the company
had remained silent), and (2) a back-end price drop, which might
over-measure the amount of price impact (e.g., if the information
would never have reached the market if the company had not
spoken).
Securities Regulation Law Journal
262 © 2016 Thomson Reuters E Securities Regulation Law Journal E Fall 2016
3. Type A Inating Misrepresentation
The solid line in Chart 3 depicts the hypothetical price move-
ment of an Inating Misrepresentation, where the misrepresen-
tation conveys information that is more favorable than what the
market anticipated, while the corrective disclosure conveys infor-
mation that is consistent with what the market had anticipated
prior to the misrepresentation. The dotted line depicts the no-
fraud counterfactual scenario, where the company had the duty
to disclose the truth at the time of the alleged misrepresentation.
The dierence between the two lines reects the price impact of
the alleged misrepresentation. As Chart 3 shows, in order for the
evidence of price impact to be consistent with this scenario, there
should be both (1) a front-end price increase, which exactly
measures the amount of price impact, and (2) a back-end price
drop, which (because of collateral damage) may slightly over-
measure the amount of price impact.
[Vol. 44:3 2016] Price Impact
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4. Type B Inating Misrepresentation
The solid line in Chart 4 is identical to the solid line in Chart 3
because both charts depict an Inating Misrepresentation.
Likewise, the dotted line in Chart 4 is identical to the dotted line
in Chart 3 because, in this context, the Type A and Type B
counterfactual scenarios do not dier. If the company had
remained silent, market expectations would have remained
unchanged, consistent with what would have happened if the
company had instead disclosed the truth. Therefore, as Chart 4
shows, in order for the evidence of price impact to be consistent
with this scenario, there should be both (1) a front-end price
increase, which exactly measures the amount of price impact,
and (2) a back-end price drop, which (because of collateral dam-
age) may slightly over-measure the amount of price impact.
Securities Regulation Law Journal
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5. Type A Aggrandizing Misrepresentation
The solid line in Chart 5 depicts the hypothetical price move-
ment of an Aggrandizing Misrepresentation, where (1) the al-
leged misrepresentation conveys information that is more favor-
able than what the market anticipated, and (2) the corrective
disclosure conveys information that is more favorable than what
the market had anticipated prior to the alleged misrepresenta-
tion but worse than what was conveyed by the misrepresentation.
The dotted line depicts the no-fraud counterfactual scenario,
where the company had the duty to disclose the truth at the time
of the alleged misrepresentation. The dierence between the two
lines reects the price impact of the alleged misrepresentation.
As Chart 5 shows, in order for the evidence of price impact to be
consistent with this scenario, there should be both (1) a front-end
price increase, which over-measures the amount of price impact,
and (2) a back-end price drop, which although more closely cor-
related with the amount of price impact may (because of collat-
eral damage) slightly over-measure it.
[Vol. 44:3 2016] Price Impact
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6. Type B Aggrandizing Misrepresentation
The solid line in Chart 6 is identical to the solid line in Chart 5
because both charts depict an Aggrandizing Misrepresentation,
but the dotted no-fraud counterfactual line diers. Here, where
the company did not have a duty to speak, there is a spectrum of
no-fraud counterfactual scenarios. On one end of the spectrum, if
the company had merely remained silent, the information might
have never reached the market, leading the market price to
remain steady (albeit deated below fundamental value). On the
other end of the spectrum, if the company had not spoken at all,
the information might have seeped into the market price even
sooner. The dierence between the solid line and the spectrum of
dotted lines reects the price impact of the alleged
misrepresentation. As Chart 6 shows, in order for the evidence of
price impact to be consistent with this scenario, there should be
both (1) a front-end price increase, which might over-measure the
amount of price impact (e.g., if the information would have been
reected in the market price even sooner if the company had
remained silent), and (2) a back-end price drop, which might
under-measure the amount of price impact (e.g., if the informa-
tion would never have reached the market if the company had
not spoken).
Securities Regulation Law Journal
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7. Type A Conrming Misrepresentation
The solid line in Chart 7 depicts the hypothetical price move-
ment of a Conrming Misrepresentation, where the alleged mis-
representation conveys information that is consistent with what
the market anticipated, while the corrective disclosure conveys
information that is worse than what the market had anticipated
prior to the misrepresentation. The dotted line depicts the no-
fraud counterfactual scenario, where the company had the duty
to disclose the truth at the time of the alleged misrepresentation.
The dierence between the two lines reects the price impact of
the alleged misrepresentation. As Chart 7 shows, in order for the
evidence of price impact to be consistent with this scenario, there
should be a back-end price drop, which may (because of collateral
damage) slightly over-measure the price impact.
[Vol. 44:3 2016] Price Impact
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8. Type B Conrming Misrepresentation
The solid line in Chart 8 is identical to the solid line in Chart 7
because both charts depict a Conrming Misrepresentation, but
the dotted no-fraud counterfactual line diers. Here, where the
company did not have a duty to speak, there is a spectrum of no-
fraud counterfactual scenarios. On one end of the spectrum, if
the company had merely remained silent, the information might
have never reached the market, leading the market price to
remain steady (albeit inated above fundamental value).41 On the
other end of the spectrum, if the company had not spoken at all,
the information might have seeped into the market price even
sooner, without the prolonging eect of the conrming
misrepresentation.42 The dierence between the solid line and the
spectrum of dotted lines reects the inationary price impact of
the alleged misrepresentation, if any. As Chart 8 shows, in order
for the evidence of price impact to be consistent with this sce-
nario, there should be a back-end price drop; but even if there is
a back-end price drop, there might not be any inationary price
impact (because the price might have remained inated absent
the alleged misrepresentation and correction).
Securities Regulation Law Journal
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9. Type A Soft-Landing Misrepresentation
The solid line in Chart 9 depicts the hypothetical price move-
ment of a Soft-Landing Misrepresentation, where (1) the alleged
misrepresentation conveys information that is worse than what
the market anticipated, and (2) the corrective disclosure conveys
information that is even worse than what was conveyed by the
alleged misrepresentation.43 The dotted line depicts the no-fraud
counterfactual scenario, where the company had the duty to dis-
close the truth at the time of the alleged misrepresentation. The
dierence between the two lines reects the price impact of the
alleged misrepresentation. As Chart 9 shows, in order for the ev-
idence of price impact to be consistent with this scenario, there
should be a back-end price drop, which may (because of collateral
damage) slightly over-measure the price impact.
[Vol. 44:3 2016] Price Impact
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10. Type B Soft-Landing Misrepresentation
The solid line in Chart 10 is identical to the solid line in Chart
9 because both charts depict a Soft-Landing Misrepresentation,
but the dotted no-fraud counterfactual line diers. Here, where
the company did not have a duty to speak, there is a spectrum of
no-fraud counterfactual scenarios. On one end of the spectrum, if
the company had merely remained silent, the information might
have never reached the market, leading the market price to
remain steady (albeit inated above fundamental value). On the
other end of the spectrum, if the company had not spoken at all,
the information might have seeped into the market price even
sooner, without the softening eect of the misrepresentation. The
dierence between the solid line and the spectrum of dotted lines
reects the inationary price impact of the alleged misrepresen-
tation, if any. As Chart 10 shows, in order for the evidence of
price impact to be consistent with this scenario, there should be a
back-end price drop; but even if there is a back-end price drop,
there might not be any inationary price impact (because the
price might have been even more inated absent the alleged mis-
representation and correction).
V. Implications of Price Impact Possibilities
The above charts reveal several insights about the price impact
inquiry, each of which is discussed below.
A. The Screening Role of Back-End Impact
For each of the ten price impact possibilities discussed above, a
back-end price drop is necessary (but not necessarily sucient) in
Securities Regulation Law Journal
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order for the evidence to be consistent with price impact (assum-
ing, of course, that an event study can dierentiate the impact of
the alleged corrective disclosure from the simultaneous impacts
of overall market changes and other rm-specic news44). In
Charts 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, and 9, the back-end price drop may slightly
over-measure the amount of price impact. In Charts 2, 8, and 10,
the back-end price drop may greatly over-measure the amount of
price impact, if any. In Chart 6, the back-end price drop may
under-measure the amount of price impact. Regardless, however,
in each case, absent any back-end price drop associated with the
alleged corrective disclosure, the evidence is inconsistent with
price impact. Therefore, regardless of the type of alleged misrep-
resentation, the initial focus of the price impact inquiry should be
on the existence, or non-existence, of a back-end price drop.
B. The Appropriate Analysis of Conrming
Misrepresentations
As demonstrated by Charts 7 and 8, the price impact inquiry
for alleged Conrming Misrepresentations should focus solely on
back-end impact and ignore the absence of front-end impact. Al-
though this insight is consistent with the analyses of most courts
and scholars to date,45 it diers from the Eighth Circuit's recent
decision in IBEW Local 98 Pension Fund v. Best Buy Co.46
As alleged in Best Buy, the company issued a press release at
8:00 a.m. on September 14, 2010, which announced that Best
Buy was increasing its full-year earnings per share (“EPS”) guid-
ance by ten cents.47 In a 10:00 a.m. conference call with analysts
that same morning, the CFO stated that “earnings were in line
with our original expectations for the year” and that “we are on
track to deliver and exceed our annual EPS guidance.”48 On
December 14, 2010, Best Buy issued a press release reporting a
decline in third quarter sales and a reduction in EPS guidance.49
The district court held that the 8:00 a.m. press release statement
was protected by the safe harbor for forward-looking statements
but that the 10:00 a.m. conference call statements were not
protected.50 The district court also certied the class.51 On inter-
locutory appeal, the Eighth Circuit considered whether the
defendants had rebutted the Basic presumption. First, the Eighth
Circuit credited evidence that, although the price increased on
September 14, the price increase occurred after the 8:00 a.m.
press release and before the 10:00 a.m. conference call and thus
was not evidence of a front-end impact of the statements in the
10:00 a.m. conference call.52 Second, the Eighth Circuit reasoned
that the “Best Buy executives' conference call statements added
nothing to what was already public.”53 Finally, in light of the
“overwhelming evidence of no ‘front-end’ price impact,” the court
held that Best Buy had rebutted the Basic presumption, despite
[Vol. 44:3 2016] Price Impact
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the evidence of a decline in price on December 14.54
I argue that, instead, the Eight Circuit's analysis should have
proceeded as follows. First, the court should have classied the
10:00 a.m. statements on September 14 as alleged Conrming
Misrepresentations. The 10:00 a.m. statements conveyed infor-
mation that was consistent with what the market anticipated (by
virtue of the 8:00 a.m. statement on the same date), while the al-
leged corrective disclosure on December 14 conveyed information
that was worse than what the market had anticipated im-
mediately prior to the 10:00 a.m. statements. Indeed, in dissent,
Judge Murphy criticized the majority opinion because “it does not
address IBEW's theory that the conference call maintained Best
Buy's stock price at its inated level.”55
Second, the court should have classied the 10:00 a.m. state-
ments as Type A or Type B. The SEC does not require line-item
disclosure of EPS guidance;56 therefore, if Best Buy had a duty to
disclose the truth during the 10:00 a.m. conference call, it would
derive from the duty to correct or update the EPS guidance
disclosed at 8:00 a.m. As explained by Bruce Mendelsohn and
Jesse Brush in a recent article published in this journal, however,
the scope of the duties to correct and update are currently
unsettled.57 Drawing from their article, there are two potential
arguments for treating these as Type A statements: (1) Best Buy
might have had a duty to correct the 8:00 a.m. EPS guidance
because, as alleged, it was incorrect at the time that it was
disclosed; or (2) Best Buy might have had a duty to update the
EPS guidance because it remained alive in the marketplace, hav-
ing been made merely two hours prior.58 On the other hand, there
are two potential arguments for treating these as Type B
statements: (1) Best Buy might not have had a duty to correct
the 8:00 a.m. EPS guidance because it was a forward-looking
statement rather than a statement of historical fact; and (2) there
might not be a duty to update forward-looking statements,
regardless of whether they remain alive in the marketplace.59
Therefore, under current law, it is unclear whether the allega-
tions in Best Buy were appropriately analyzed under Chart 7 or
Chart 8.
Regardless, however, contrary to the Eighth Circuit's analysis,
the absence of front-end impact was irrelevant. Rather, evidence
of a price drop on December 14 upon the alleged corrective
disclosure was consistent with price impact. If the 10:00 a.m.
statements were properly classied as Type B, despite evidence
of a back-end drop, Best Buy could have nonetheless attempted
to rebut the Basic presumption by arguing that, if the company
had merely remained silent about EPS guidance during the 10:00
a.m. conference call, the price would have remained steady.
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Indeed, in dissent, Judge Murphy argued: “Best Buy could have
rebutted the presumption of reliance by producing evidence show-
ing that the alleged misrepresentations had not counteracted a
price decline that would otherwise have occurred. Best Buy
produced no such evidence, and the presumption was not
rebutted.”60 Therefore, regardless of whether the alleged conrma-
tory misrepresentations made during the 10:00 a.m. conference
call were appropriately classied as Type A or Type B, the Eighth
Circuit should have armed the district court's order certifying
the class.
C. The Special Importance of Burdens of Production
and Persuasion for Type B Conrming and Soft-
Landing Misrepresentations
As demonstrated by Charts 8 and 10, Type B Conrming and
Soft-Landing Misrepresentations present an array of potential
price impact scenarios, even assuming a back-end price drop. At
one end of the spectrum, even if there is evidence of a back-end
price drop, there might not be any price impact (e.g., if the truth
would never have reached the market if the company had merely
remained silent).61 At the other end of the spectrum, the back-end
price drop might reliably approximate price impact (e.g., if the
truth would have reached the market sooner if the company had
merely remained silent).62
Where on this spectrum a particular case lies depends on the
applicable counterfactual scenario. And yet, how might a party
prove when (and if) the truth would have reached the market if
the company had remained silent? Absent a crystal ball, this is
inherently unknowable, and thus unprovable. (Indeed, in re-
sponse to Judge Murphy's Best Buy dissent discussed above in
Part V.B., one wonders how Best Buy might have proered evi-
dence “showing that the alleged misrepresentations had not
counteracted a price decline that would otherwise have occurred”
if Best Buy had remained silent.63) Therefore, the burdens of pro-
duction and persuasion on price impact are especially important
for Type B Conrming and Soft-Landing Misrepresentations.
To date, most courts have placed the burdens of production and
persuasion on price impact on the defendant.64 A few commenta-
tors (including this author) have suggested that these burdens
should be governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 301, such that
the defendant bears the initial burden of production but, if met,
the plainti bears the ultimate burden of persuasion.65 Regard-
less, however, every commentator and court agrees that the
defendant bears, at the very least, the initial burden of
production. Therefore, in the context of Type B Conrming and
Soft-Landing Misrepresentations, assuming the existence of a
back-end price drop, the defendant is probably incapable of rebut-
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ting the Basic presumption, despite the (unprovable) possibility
that that truth would never have reached the market if the
company had merely remained silent.
D. The Impact on Pleading Incentives
As discussed above in Part V.A., the existence of a back-end
price drop associated with the alleged corrective disclosure is nec-
essary in order for the evidence to be consistent with price impact,
regardless of which of the ten price impact possibilities is alleged.
Yet, as demonstrated by Charts 1-6, the existence of a front-end
price increase associated with the alleged misrepresentation is
also necessary in order for the evidence to be consistent with
price impact for Misdirecting, Inating, and Aggrandizing
Misrepresentations. As such, to the extent that plaintis allege a
Misdirecting, Inating, or Aggrandizing Misrepresentation, the
absence of either a front-end increase or a back-end drop should
rebut the Basic presumption. Therefore, there is an incentive for
plaintis to allege, at least in the alternative, that all alleged
misrepresentations are either Conrming or Soft-Landing
Misrepresentations because the absence of a front-end price
increase is not inconsistent with price impact for these types of
misrepresentations. A number of commentators have already
noted that allegations of conrmatory misrepresentations may be
more common than allegations of non-conrmatory misrepresen-
tations;66 in light of the impact of this pleading decision on the
price impact inquiry, this trend will likely continue.
VI. Conclusion
In sum, I argue that, because price impact is properly under-
stood as price distortion, the price impact inquiry in inherently
comparative. I further argue that the appropriate no-fraud
counterfactual scenario depends on (1) whether the alleged mis-
representation is appropriately classied as a Misdirecting,
Inating, Aggrandizing, Conrming, or Soft-Landing Misrepre-
sentation; and (2) whether the alleged misrepresentation is Type
A (because the defendant had a duty to speak) or Type B (because
the defendant could merely have remained silent). Drawing there-
from, I contend that there are ten price impact possibilities and
that the focus of the price impact inquiry depends on which sce-
nario is alleged, as demonstrated above in Charts 1–10. Finally, I
argue that this analysis yields meaningful insights about the
screening role of a back-end price decrease, the appropriate anal-
ysis of alleged Conrming Misrepresentations, the importance of
burdens of production and persuasion on price impact, and the
incentives for plaintis to allege Conrming or Soft-Landing
Misrepresentations.
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66Coates, supra note 12, at 15 (“[A] common form of misstatement is the
‘conrmatory lie,’ i.e., a statement that merely conrms what the market al-
ready (falsely) believes about a company, such as an earnings release that
matches analyst expectations (when in fact the company's earnings are falsely
inated by fraud).”); Murdock, supra note 22, at 563 (“[A]nother, and possibly
more typical, situation arises when there has been a series of positive develop-
ments and then an unanticipated problem occurs. Rather than acknowledging
the problem, management continues to make positive statements that are
designed, not necessarily to increase the price of the stock, but to retard a
decline.”); Gross, supra note 18, at 492 (noting that “stock prices often do not
move in response to the initial dissemination of fraudulent statements”).
[Vol. 44:3 2016] Price Impact
281© 2016 Thomson Reuters E Securities Regulation Law Journal E Fall 2016
